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Truthfulness and truth are not clearly distinguished in
Jaina scriptures. A maxim of speaking the truth is stated in the
so-called “satya-mahÍvrata”, which Jain ascetics recite twice a
day during their obligatory pratikramaÔa ritual. In accordance
with the preferred Jain method of negative determination, the
general principle of truthful speech is treated in terms of its
characteristic violations, aticÍra, that is, as the opposite of
speaking non-truth, a-satya.1 Normative principles such as this
are constitutive for Jain discourse to the extent that they are
used by speech communities, both to generate and to interpret
speech. The precise implications of the maxim of truthfulness
for language usage are specified in form of a distinction of
four types or ‘species’ of speech, bhÍsÍ-jÍya <bhÍÙÍ-jÍta>,
which are at the centre of the Jain theory of discourse,
supplemented by context-sensitive rules for proper ways of
speaking, and examples. These analytical categories should be
known and utilised by mendicants (ideally by all Jains) to
prevent both the preparation and performance of violence,
Írambha.
The rules and clauses for language usage expressed by
the bhÍÙÍ-jÍta tetrad consider speech primarily from a normative
point of view, rather than from the perspective of the intention
of the speaker. In this respect, the analysis of the uses of
language in the Jaina scriptures shares many characteristics
with the approach of universal pragmatics in contemporary
philosophy:2
‘A mendicant should know that there are four
kinds of speech: The first is truth; the second is untruth;
the third is truth mixed with untruth; what is neither
truth, nor untruth, nor truth mixed with untruth, that is
the fourth kind of speech: neither truth nor untruth’
(ÀyÍra 2.4.1.4).3
Notably, the same scheme of four modes is applied to
speech and to cognition (maÔa <manas>) or knowledge (ÔÍna
<jñÍna>) (Viy 622b/8.7.1b, 874b/15.1.4). Hence, the four
bhÍsÍ-guttis <bhÍÙÍ-guptis>, or controls of speech, and the
four maÔa-guttis <mano-guptis>, or controls of the inner sense,
are both characterised by the same terms in Utt 24.19–23. The
four modes, thus, represent general attitudes towards truth,
both in mind and in speech:
1. saccÍ <satyÍ> truth
2. mosÍ <mØÙÍ> untruth
3. saccÍ-mosÍ <satyÍ-mØÙÍ > truth mixed with
untruth
4. asaccÍ-mosÍ <asatyÍ-mØÙÍ > neither truth nor
untruth
The formal structure of the four alternatives (tetra-lemma)
is known as catuÙ-koÛi in Buddhist literature, but used
differently here.4 As the frequent use of the four alternatives
(catur-bhaÕga or catur-bhaÕgi) as a classificatory scheme in
ThÍÔa IV, for instance, indicates,5 the catuÙ-koÛi is used in
Jain scholasticism in a similar way as the nikÙepa pattern,
described by BRUHN–HA
. .
RTEL (1978: v) as a formal
‘dialectical technique (often employed in a “pseudo-exegetical
function”)’.6
JACOBI (1884: 150 n. 2) understood the first three
modes to refer to assertions and the fourth to injunctions.
* This article is a slightly amended extract of a chapter of my essay
‘Power and Insight in Jaina Discourse’, published in Logic and Belief in
Indian Philosophy, ed. Piotr BALCEROWICZ, 85-217. Warsaw: Oriental
Institute (Warsaw Indological Studies, Vol. 3) / Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas,
2010. It is republished here, with permission of the editor, as an offering
in memory of Muni JambÜvijayajÐ.
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According to PaÔÔ 860 (255b), the first two modes are distinct
(pajjattiyÍ <paryÍptÍ>) ways of speaking, which can be
analysed in terms of the true / false distinction,7 and the third
and fourth are indistinct (apajjattiyÍ <aparyÍptÍ>) ways of
speaking, whose validity or non-validity is indeterminable. The
sub-categories of distinct speech are true speech (satyÍ bhÍÙÍ)
and wrong or false speech (mØÙÍ bhÍÙÍ), and the sub-categories
of indistinct speech are true-as-well-as-false speech (satyÍ-mØÙÍ
bhÍÙÍ) and neither-true-nor-false speech (asatyÍ-mØÙÍ bhÍÙÍ).
A muni should use only the first and the last mode of speech,
and avoid the remaining two ‘by all means’ (DVS
2
 7.1) in
order to minimise harm:
‘A monk or a nun, considering well, should use
true and accurate speech, or speech which is neither
truth nor untruth (i.e. injunctions); for such speech is
not sinful, blameable, rough, stinging, &c.’ (ÀyÍra
2.4.1.7).8
(a) Speaking truthfully can either be interpreted ethically, as
straightforward and accurate talk (on-record), or ontologically,
as an assertion of the way things are.9 Both perspectives can
be found in the Jain and non-Jain commentary literature alike,10
often mixed together, as the identical characterisation of the
four guptis of mind and speech illustrates. SatyÍ bhÍÙÍ refers
both to the psychological and the normative conditions of
truthfulness, that is, sincere, grammatically accurate and
contextually acceptable speech, and to propositional truth.11 It
is explicitly recognised in the Jain scriptures (though not in
these terms) that, as a speech act, propositional language has
also an expressive and normative content. The normative, the
expressive, and the propositional components of spoken
language are altogether necessary to communicate something.
PaÔÔ 862 states that ‘the truth or validity of the speech depends
on various situations and conditions’ (MÀLVAÇIYÀ 1971:
325). Ten different dimensions or ‘validity conditions’ of truthful
speech are distinguished12 (the compound “saccÍ <satyÍ> can
be translated as ‘sincere’ or ‘true’ ‘according to the conventions
of ____’):13
1. jaÔavaya-saccÍ <janapada-satyÍ> Country
2. sammata-saccÍ <sammata-satyÍ> Consensus
3. ÛhavaÔÍ-saccÍ <sthÍpanÍ-satyÍ> Representation
4. ÔÍma-saccÍ <nÍma-satyÍ> Name
5. rÜva-saccÍ <rÜpa-satyÍ> Form
6. paÎucca-saccÍ <pratÐtya-satyÍ> Confirmation
7. vavahÍra-saccÍ <vyavahÍra-satyÍ> Custom
8. bhÍva-saccÍ <bhÍva-satyÍ> Inner Meaning
9. joga-saccÍ <yoga-satyÍ> Practice
10. ovamma-saccÍ <aupamya-satyÍ> Analogy
The same list is given and explained in MÜlÍcÍra 5.111–
116, with exception of yoga-satyÍ, which is replaced by
category No. 8 sambhÍvanÍ-satyÍ, translated by OKUDA (1975:
128) as ‘truth of possibilities’ (Möglichkeitswahrheit; see infra
p. 161).14 There is no apparent systematic connection between
the categories in this list. Yet, the list is clearly informed by
the four ‘doors of disquisition’ (aÔuogaddÍra <anuyoga-dvÍra>)
of canonical hermeneutics (AÔD 75), especially by the method
of contextual interpretation (aÔugama <anugama>) through
progressive specification via fixed standpoints (naya) (AÔD
601–606).15 The occurrence of the terms nÍma, sthÍpanÍ and
bhÍva indicates the deliberate incorporation of a variant of the
‘canonical’ nikkheva <nikÙepa>, as BHATT (1978: xv, 20)
suggested, although the davva <dravya> standpoint is missing.16
A nikÙepa is a scholastic scheme which delineates fixed
perspectives for the analysis of the principal dimensions of the
possible contextual meanings of a word (contemporary
linguistics is still struggling to establish comparable categories).
The original purpose of the list of ten, as a whole, may have
been similar. That is, assessing the meaning of an utterance
from several commonly relevant perspectives.17
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Most categories are self-explanatory. Truthful utterances
based on the linguistic conventions of a country are explained
by the commentaries through the example that ‘in Konkan
piccaÓ is said for payas and that by the gopÍla the lotus is
called aravinda only’ (SCHUBRING 2000: 157 n. 4, § 74).
Because terms such as these are synonyms, they are all equally
true.18 Similarly, what is accepted by many people, i.e. linguistic
expressions, is conventionally true (sammata-satyÍ).19 Pragmatic
theories of truth would fall under this perspective. A figurative
representation, such as a statue which is not god itself, may
itself not be accurate, but that what it symbolises can be
recognized as true (sthÍpanÍ-satyÍ).20 The same applies to a
name such as Devadatta or ‘given by god’ (nÍma-satyÍ) (MÀc
113).21 Allusions to external appearance in form of prototypes
such as ‘white cranes’ (not all cranes are white) are examples
of rÜpa-satyÍ.22 According to the commentators Haribhadra
(PaÔÔV) and Malayagiri (PaÔÔÌ), the term pratÐtya-satyÍ
designates an utterance which is true only under certain
conditions, and thus predicated on empirical confirmation.23
Examples are relative size (‘this is long’) or the relative state
of transformation of objects at a given time (cf. MÀc 114).24
Like other conventional expressions which, under certain
conditions, could equally be classified as ‘truth-mixed-with-
untruth’, common or idiomatic utterances such as ‘the kÜra
(i.e. the cooked rice) is cooking’ (MÀc 114) are acceptable as
customarily true (vyavahÍra-satyÍ).25 The Ëvetâmbara
commentators explain the inner truth (bhÍva-satyÍ) expressed
by certain utterances with the example of a ‘white crane’
(ÚuklÍ balÍkÍ),26 which MÀc 113 uses to illustrate rÜpa-satyÍ,
whereas VaÛÛakera interprets the term as designating the ‘higher
truth’, i.e. saying something untrue in order to avoid injury to
someone (MÀc 116). This perspective is also applied to other
contexts in the Ëvetâmbara texts ÀyÍra 2.4.1.6 and DVS 7.11.
An example of truth based on association with practice (yoga-
satyÍ) is to describe someone according to his / her activity,
for instance the designation chattrÐ (a kÙatriya who should
protect his realm performs chattra-yoga), or daÔÎÐ (who
performs daÔÎa-yoga or punishment).27 Instead of yoga-satyÍ,
the MÜlÍcÍra 115 has sambhÍvanÍ-satyÍ, which means that
assuming the possibility of something is a valid condition of
truthful language: ‘If he wanted, he could do it. If Indra wanted,
he could overturn the JambudvÐpa’ (OKUDA 1975: 128). As
an example of speaking the truth, using comparison or analogy
(aupamya-satyÍ),28 MÀc 116 mentions the word palidovama <
palyôpama>, literally ‘like a sack of corn’, which designates
a high number.29 AÔuogaddÍrÍiÓ (AGD) 368–382 demonstrates
the practical ‘usefulness’ of this simile through the naya method
of progressive disambiguation.30
(b) Untruthful language or speaking untruthfully (mØÙÍ
bhÍÙÍ) is the proscribed opposite of truth or truthfulness.31 In
contrast to the ten conditions of truth, featuring the semantics
of propositional utterances, the ten conditions out of which
untruth ‘arises’ (compound: “nissiya <niÏsØita>), listed in PaÔÔ
863, are primarily psycho-physical conditions.32 According to
SCHUBRING (2000: 157, § 69), ‘speech springing from
emotion is by itself understood as mosÍ.’33 Eight of the ten
categories overlap with the standard Jain list of the eighteen
sources of sin (pÍva-ÛhÍÔa <pÍpa-sthÍna>),34 starting with the
four passions (kasÍya <kaÙÍya>), and attachment and aversion,
which in the PaÔÔ are the sole cause of karmic bondage,
disregarding yoga, or activity (MÀLVAÇIYÀ 1971: 384). Most
types of untrue speech, conditioned by these factors, can be
categorised as expressive utterances. The last two categories,
ÍkhyÍyika-niÏsØita35 and upaghÍta-niÏsØita,36 do not refer merely
to an underlying negative psycho-physical state in general,
but to the unspecified psycho-physical conditions of two
specific types of self-referentially defined commonly untrue
speech acts—hearsay and false accusation—with predominately
constantive and regulative attributes.
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1. koha-nissiya <krodha-niÏsØita> Anger
2. mÍÔa-nissiya <mÍna-niÏsØita> Pride
3. mÍyÍ-nissiya <mÍyÍ-niÏsØita> Deceit
4. lobha-nissiya <lobha-niÏsØita> Greed
5. pejja-nissiya <premana-niÏsØita> Attachment
6. dosa-nissiya <dveÙa-niÏsØita> Aversion
7. hÍsa-nissiya <hÍsya-niÏsØita> Ridicule
8. bhaya-nissiya <bhaya-niÏsØita> Fear
9. akkhÍiya-nissiya <ÍkhyÍyika-niÏsØita> Hearsay
10.uvaghÍya-nissiya <upaghÍta-niÏsØita> False Accusation
CAILLAT (1991: 11) observed that the PaÔÔ presents the
kaÙÍyas as the cause of untruth, not of injury, as in ÀyÍra
2.4.1.1 and DVS 7.11. This change of perspective, from ahiÔsÍ
to “satya as the main criterion, may reflect the shift of emphasis
in classical Jain karman theory from act to intention. The ten
categories seem to have in common that they refer to acts
which, intentionally or unintentionally, produce unwholesome
perlocutionary effects in the addressee (and the speaker as
well). They are either factually false, ethically wrong or both.37
(g) The category ‘partially true speech’38 or ‘truth-
mixed-with-untruth’ (saccÍ-mosÍ bhÍsÍ <satyÍ-mØÙÍ bhÍÙÍ>)
should not be mixed up with the conditionally true standpoints
of syÍd-vÍda, which apply only to valid statements, not to
false knowledge (apramÍÔa). ‘Truth-mixed-with-untruth’
designates intentionally or unintentionally ambiguous or unclear
speech, which is strictly prohibited.39 The meaning of the term
is explained by DVS 7.4–10:
4. But this and that topic which confines the Eternal
within limits—this half-true speech the wise [monk]
should avoid.
5. By a speech which is untrue, though its appearance
is that of a true one, a man is touched by sin, how
much more a man who speaks plain untruth!’ (DVS
1
7.4).40
SatyÍ-mØÙÍ bhÍÙÍ is sinful language, based on the whole
on non-universalisable ethical principles. For instance, the
language of heretical forest-monks, who do not abstain from
killing, whose thought, speech and behaviour is not well
controlled:
‘They employ speech that is true and untrue at
the same time: “do not beat me, beat others; do not
abuse me, abuse others; do not capture me, capture
others; do not torment me, torment others; do not
deprive me of life, deprive others of life”’ (Suy 2.2.21).
The ten types of truth-mixed-with-untruth listed in PaÔÔ
86541 do not explicitly address expressive or regulative aspects
of speech acts, but only propositional content; despite the fact
that performatives can also be both true and untrue. According
to the commentaries, all types deal with indiscriminate speech,
and with semantic and logical fallacies, such as category
mistakes regarding the quality or quantity of objects or temporal
modalities which can be easily ‘mixed up’ (compound: “missiyÍ
<miÚritÍ>), for instance in utterances designating part-whole
relationships.
1. uppaÔÔa-missiyÍ <utpanna-miÚritÍ> Born
2. vigaya-missiyÍ <vigata-miÚritÍ> Destroyed
3. uppaÔÔa-vigaya-missiyÍ <utpanna-vigata-
   miÚritÍ>  Born-Destroyed
4. jÐva-missiyÍ <jÐva-miÚritÍ> Life
5. ajÐva-missiyÍ <ajÐva-miÚritÍ> Matter
6. jÐvÍjÐva-missiyÍ <jÐvÍjÐva-miÚritÍ> Life-Matter
7. aÔanta-missiyÍ <ananta-miÚritÍ> Infinite
8. paritta-missiyÍ <parÐta-miÚritÍ> Separate
9. addhÍ-missiyÍ <adhva-miÚritÍ> Time
10. addhÍddhÍ-missiyÍ <ardhÍdhva-miÚritÍ> Halftime
The list of ten modalities evidently reflects general issues of
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particular concern for Jain doctrine. It can be thematically
subdivided in two triplets and two pairs. The first triplet—
utpanna, vigata, utpanna-vigata—addresses unclear distinctions
concerning life and death. The commentators explain the
meaning of utpanna-miÚritÍ as speaking in non-specific ways
about the born, mixed with references to the yet unborn; for
instance birth occurring in this or that village or town, that ten
or more or less boys were born (‘ten boys were born in this
village today’) etc.42 In the same way, vigata-miÚritÍ refers to
cases of ‘stating mortality in an indefinite way, e.g. saying
that ten people have died in this village, etc.’
(RATNACANDRA 1988 IV: 400).43 Utpanna-vigata-miÚritÍ
refers to both true and false, or contradictory assertions
(visaÓvÍda) regarding manifestations of both birth and death.44
The second triplet—jÐva, ajÐva, jÐvÍjÐva—similarly addresses
the problem of pointing in a general way to ‘great numbers’
of either living or dead beings, or quantities of mixed living
and dead beings.45 Life (jÐva) in abstract and concrete form
can be confused through vague language, such as the language
of sets (rÍÚi), or other numerical expressions. The same applies
to matter (ajÐva), and both life and matter (jÐvÍjÐva). The
consequence of imprecise language may be unintentional
violence against individual living beings (in a ‘heap of dead
beings’). According to Àvassaya-nijjutti (ÀvNi 8.56–100), one
of the principal heretics of the canonical period, Rohagutta,
committed the mistake of mixing up categories by positing a
third principle, no-jÐva or the half-living, which mediates
between jÐva and ajÐva. Hence, his heresy was called terÍsiyÍ.46
The pair ananta and parÐta addresses indiscriminate language
regarding aspects of finite-infinite, part-whole, or singular term-
existence relationships. The commentaries explain ananta-miÚritÍ
with reference to the case of certain plants, for instance root
vegetables such as radish (mÜlaka), which have only one body,
yet are composed of an infinite number of souls (ananta-
jÐva).47 The category parÐta-miÚritÍ focuses, conversely, for
instance on the independence and separateness of each
individual element within a composite form of vegetation.48
The two ontological levels of the relationship between one
and many can easily be mixed up in these cases; which has
potential ethical (karmic) consequences. One of the principle
concerns of the PannavaÔÍ, highlighted in Malayagiri’s
commentary, is the difference between the categories infinite
(ananta) and uncountable (asaÓkhyÍta).49 With regard to adhva,
time, speech is both true and untrue if one says, for some
reason, that ‘it is night’ during the daytime, or ‘get up, it is
day’ when it is night.50 The same applies to the part of a
measure of time, or ardhÍdhva, such as a prahara, a quarter of
the bright or dark period of the day.51 The statements may be
true in as much as time in general is concerned, but false with
regard to time in particular (i.e. it may be bright, although
technically it is still night).52 Examples for a potential mix up
of the modalities of time, which may have negative moral
consequences in cases of promises for instance, are given in
ÀyÍra 2.4.2, and in DVS 7.6–10 as paradigmatic cases for
satyÍ-mØÙÍ speech. The illocutionary form of these sentences
is not essential, since they can be transformed into propositions
of the form: ‘x promises (commands etc.), that p’:53
‘6. Such speech therefore, as e.g. “we [shall] go”,
“we shall say”, “we shall have to do that”, or: “I shall
do that”, or “he shall do that”, 7. uncertain in the
future or with regard to a matter of the present [or] of
the past, a wise [monk] should avoid. 8.9. If [a monk]
does not know, [or] has some doubt about, a matter
which concerns past, present and future, he should not
say: “it is thus”; 10. (this he should do only) when
there is no room for doubt’ (DVS
1
 7.6–10).54
Somadeva, in his YaÚastilaka of 959 CE (YT, p. 349–
350), mentions a similar example of a statement which is on
the whole true but to some extent false, that is, when someone
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‘after promising to give something at the end of a fortnight,
gives it after a month or a year’ (HANDIQUI 1968: 265). He
also mentions the statement ‘he cooks food or weaves clothes’
as one which is to some extent true but on the whole false
because ‘properly speaking, one cooks rice etc. and weaves
yarn’. A different example of mixed speech, mentioned in Viy
18.7.1 (749a), are utterances of someone who is possessed.
The fact that this case, referring to an existentially mixed
psycho-physical state rather than to semantic ambiguity, cannot
be easily fitted into any of the ten categories illustrates that
the list is not exhaustive. From other viewpoints, the examples
may also fit the categories of the other lists.
All of the ten enumerated modalities seem to refer to
utterances in which the universal and the particular, or
modalities of time, quantif iers, or other categories,55 are mixed
up in an indiscriminate and hence ambiguous way.56 Though
the mistakes discussed in the texts seem to be primarily based
on indiscriminate cognition, producing objectionable uncertainty
(cf. ÀyÍra 2.4.1–2), the ten categories are very broad and can
cover a great variety of motives, logical and semantic
conundrums, such as vagueness or paradoxes, and linguistic
forms and discursive strategies, such as off-record uses of
metaphor, similes, veiled speech and politeness, which GRICE
(1975) and BROWN-LEVINSON (1978) have analysed as
popular forms for saying one thing and meaning another.57
These phenomena deserve more detailed analysis in future
studies. For the purpose of this essay, a few comparative notes
on the implications of the findings for the question of the
stance of Jain philosophy on the law of non-contradiction
must suffice.
For PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1989: 3), ‘admission or
insistence, that some statement is both true and false, in a
context where not everything is accepted or some things are
rejected, is a sure sign of a paraconsistent approach—in fact
a dialethic approach’, i.e. the assumption that ‘the world is
inconsistent’. The Greek word dialetheia (two-way truth) refers
to a true contradiction facing both truth and falsity.58 PRIEST–
ROUTLEY (1983: 17) were the first to point out parallels
between Jaina logic and modern discussive logic, but argue,
like most logicians before them, that Jain perspectivism is
predicated on the rejection of the law of contradiction.59
However, GANERI (2002: 274) demonstrated in his re-
construction of the assumptions underlying the method of
seven-fold predication (sapta-bhaÕgÐ), based on an extension
of discussive logic via modalised many-valued truth-tables,
that Jain logic ‘does not involve any radical departure from
classical logic … The underlying logic within each standpoint
is classical, and it is further assumed that each standpoint or
participant is internally consistent.’ The findings of
BALCEROWICZ (2003: 64) on the contextual logic of the
seven nayas concur with this general conclusion. Both authors
show that Jain logic is context-sensitive and a quasi-functional
system.
To syÍd-vÍda and anekÍnta-vÍda the Jain catuÙ-koÛi of
the modes of speech can be added, as another example of
‘Jain logic’ which clearly operates within the confines of the
law of non-contradiction, and does not need to be interpreted
as a form of scepticism, nor of syncretism predicated on the
notion of a total truth integration of all viewpoints, as
MATILAL (1981) argues. Our brief glance at the Jain
interpretation of the third mode of the so-called ‘four-valued
logic’ of the catuÙ-koÛi, applied to language usage, that is, the
explicit exclusion of the values ‘false’ and ‘both true and
false’, showed that ‘Jain logic’ does not ‘flatly deny’60 the law
of non-contradiction. The examples in Jain scriptures for modes
of speech which are both-true-and-false, and their explicit
rejection, demonstrate, on the contrary, that Jain philosophy is
unequivocally opposed to violations of the law of non-
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contradiction. This conclusion is also borne out by the Jain
analysis of the temporal aspects of action (Viy 1.1.1=13a,
9.33.2d = 484a), which explicitly denies the possibility that an
action that is being performed is not equal to the completed
action, as the heretic JamÍli held (‘has the bed been made or
is it being made’). The question of the identity of an action
in time has important consequence for the evaluation of karmic
consequences, also of speech-acts. Contrary to PRIEST–
ROUTLEY’s (1989) intuitions, it seems, the main technique of
argumentation used by Jain philosophers in all these cases
resembles Aristotle’s refutation of Heraclitus and other
‘paraconsistent’ thinkers in ancient Greece:
‘Key parts of his analysis involved the use of
time to avoid contradiction—instead of saying that a
changing thing was both in a given state and also not
in that state, it was said that the thing was in that state
at time t1, but not in that state at a different time t2—
and the theory of potentiality—required to reunify these
now temporarily isolated states as parts of the one
(and same) change. The appeal to different temporal
quantifiers illustrated the method of (alleged)
equivocation used since ancient times to avoid
contradiction and reinforce consistency hypothesis;
namely, where both A and -- A appear to hold, find a
respect or factor or difference r such that it can be said
that A holds in respect r1 and -- A in respect r2. It can
then be said that a contradiction resulted only by
equivocation on respect or factor r. Often however the
method of alleged equivocation does not work in a
convincing way, and it breaks down in an irreparable
way with the semantic paradoxes, as the Megarians
were the first to realize’ (PRIEST–ROUTLEY 1989: 8).
Speech that is both-true-and-untrue is rejected in the
Jain scriptures, because it mixes aspects which can be
discriminated, if necessary with the help of the method of
perspective variation in time. To what extent ancient Jain
philosophers would have agreed with Aristotle on this point is
a question which can only be clearly answered in a separate
study. It seems to me that the Jain theory of time is
fundamental, also for Jain perspectivism.
(d) The most interesting of the four modes of speech
(and cognition) is ‘speaking neither truth nor untruth’ (asaccÍ-
mosÍ). That is, speech to which the true / false distinction is
not applicable. Twelve types of the asatyÍ-mØÙÍ bhÍÙÍ are
distinguished in PaÔÔ 866 = Viy 10.3.3 (499b):61
1. ÍmantaÔÐ <ÍmantraÔÐ> Address
2. ÍÔavaÔÐ <ÍjñÍpanÐ> Order
3. jÍyaÔÐ <yÍcanÍ> Request
4. pucchaÔÐ <pØcchanÐ> Question
5. paÔÔavaÔÐ <prajñÍpanÐ> Communication
6. paccakkhÍÔÐ <pratyÍkhyÍnÐ> Renunciation
7. icchÍÔulomÍ <icchÍnulomÍ> Consent
8. aÔabhiggahiyÍ <anabhigØhÐtÍ> Unintelligible
9. abhiggahiyÍ <abhigØhÐtÍ> Intelligible
10. saÓsaya-karaÔÐ <saÓÚaya-karaÔÐ> Doubt-Creating
11. voyaÎÍ <vyÍkØtÍ> Explicit
12. avvoyaÎÍ <avyÍkØtÍ> Implicit
Nine of the twelve categories are also listed in MÍc
5.118–119. The categories 1–7 are identical in both texts. Of
the last five, only saÓÚaya (No. 10) is mentioned by VaÛÛakera,
and a category labelled aÔakkhara <anakÙara>, ‘incomprehen-
sible’, which can be read as an equivalent of aÔabhiggahiyÍ
<anabhigØhÐtÍ> (No. 8, maybe also incorporating aspects of
No. 12).62
Speaking neither-truth-nor-untruth is interpreted by
JACOBI (1884: 150 n. 2, 151)63 and MÀLVAÇIYÀ (1971:
325 f.) as referring to injunctions. However, considering the
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great variety of listed speech acts (only the first three are
injunctions), it seems better to use AUSTIN’s (1962) term
‘performatives’, which are by definition neither true nor false,
to characterise the first seven terms.64 The last five terms cover
aspects which GRICE (1975) discussed under the
conversational maxims of relation (‘relevance’) and manner
(‘avoid obscurity’). In Austin’s terminology, addressing,
ordering, requesting, and questioning etc. are all illocutionary
acts. Questions,65 commands, and exclamations are not
propositions, since they can not be asserted or denied; that is,
they are neither true nor false. Imperatives (directives), such
as orders and requests, and regulatives (commissives), such as
consenting and renouncing (promising, vowing etc.), through
which the speaker commits him / herself to perform certain
actions in future, imply normative conditions which ought to
be fulfilled, but which are not fulfilled yet. In this sense, the
propositional content is also neither true nor false. Truth, and
its opposite, falsity, are properties that belong only to
propositions. Propositions are statements that either assert or
deny that something is the case. Not all sentences are true or
false, because not all sentences make such claims. Commands,
questions, and expressions of volition neither assert nor deny
that something is the case, and are, consequently, neither true
nor false.
ARISTOTLE (PH 4) already noted that ‘every sentence
is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in
them either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is a sentence, but
is neither true nor false.’ Problems related to the ontological
and truth-functional status of future events and the grammatical
future were also discussed in Greek philosophy, which may or
may not have influenced Indian philosophy in this point.66274
In De Interpretatione (PH), ARISTOTLE offers the following
solution to a paradox posed by Diodoros Cronus as to the
truth-value of the sentence ‘Will there be a sea battle
tomorrow?’ Any definite answer (‘yes’ or ‘no’) to this
indecidable question is presently neither true nor false, but if
in future one becomes true, then the other becomes false:
‘One of the two propositions in such instances
must be true and the other false, but we cannot say
determinately that this or that is false, but must leave
the alternative undecided. One may indeed be more
likely to be true than the other, but it cannot be either
actually true or actually false. It is therefore plain that
it is not necessary that of an affirmation and a denial
one should be true and the other false. For in the case
of that which exists potentially, but not actually, the
rule which applies to that which exists actually does
not hold good’ (PH 9).
For Aristotle, as for the Jains, it is both unethical and
factually wrong to assume the future is determined, since
actions evidently influence events. Although it is not entirely
clear what exactly Aristotle and the Jain author(s) had in mind,
in both cases the commitment to free will and to the logic of
events overrules the logic of propositions. Generally, empirical
facts can neither be proven true nor false by logical necessity:
‘Even if I say “It’s raining now” when the sun is shining, I
have not said something that is necessarily false, just something
that happens to be false’ (HARNAD 1999: 1).67 From a purely
logical point of view, Bertrand RUSSELL (1905) showed that
all predicates with variables are not propositions to which a
truth value can be attached in an unambiguous way. Hence
they are neither true nor false. However, they can be
transformed into propositions by replacing the variable with a
value or a quantifier.68 It is, of course, difficult to say to what
extent ancient Jain philosophers already shared certain intuitions
with modern logicians.
The first seven categories, sometimes combined, cover
most speech acts a Jain ascetic would conventionally use in
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contexts of monastic life;69 for instance taking vows
(paccakkhÍÔa), requesting permission (ÍpucchaÔÍ), ordering
(ÍjñÍ), confessing (ÍlocanÍ), begging forgiveness (kÙamÍpaÔÍ)
etc. ÀmantaÔÐ <ÍmantraÔÐ> speech or language, for instance,
is ‘used for attracting somebody’s attention, a vocative word
or expression’ (GHATAGE 2003 III.2: 1001), for instance ‘O
Devadatta!’70 MÀLVAÇIYÀ (1971: 325) gives the following
examples of an address and an order: ‘when a person wanting
John to come near him says “O! John”, or ‘when a person
says to another person, “Go ahead”.’ However, not in all
contexts are such expressions neither-true-nor-false. Under
certain circumstances, the first example may represent or can
be read as an ‘indirect’ or ‘implicit performative’ speech act
clad in form of an address, and it could be argued that, in
certain contexts, the second example does not correspond to
the prescription in ÀyÍra 2.4 for mendicants to avoid pragmatic
interventions.
The last five terms of the list are of a different nature.
The term aÔabhiggahiyÍ<anabhigØhÐtÍ> refers to ‘unintelligible
or incomprehensible speech’ (RATNACANDRA 1988 I: 156),
which is either ‘irrelevant’ (DELEU (1970: 169) or / and
‘unacceptable’ (GHATAGE 1996 I: 237), but neither-true-nor-
false. Its antonym, abhiggahammi boddhavvÍ, intelligible
instruction, refers to ‘clear and intelligible language’
(RATNACANDRA 1988 IV: 351), which is ‘relevant’ and
‘acceptable’, and neither-true-nor-false.71 Malayagiri’s
commentary72 explains the difference between irrelevant and
relevant speech through the following example: ‘to the question
“What shall I do now?” the answer “Do as you like” is
aÔabhiggahiyÍ, the answer “Do this, do not that!” is
abhiggahiyÍ’ (DELEU 1970: 169).
It is not entirely clear why saÓsaya-karaÔÐ bhÍsÍ
<saÓÚaya-karaÔÐ bhÍÙÍ>, ‘ambiguous language which causes
doubt’ (RATNACANDRA 1988 IV: 570), is regarded as
neither-true-nor-false, and therefore permissible. It must be
assumed that only the use of strategically ambiguous messages
for the purpose of creating vairÍgya-shocks is seen as legitimate,
but not language which creates doubt about Jainism in the
minds of believers. He seems to follow Malayagiri (PaÔÔÌ),
who argued that from the niÚcaya-naya not only satya-mØÙÍ
but also asatyÍ-mØÙÍ statements are false—‘if they are spoken
with the intention of deceiving others’ (MÀLVAÇIYÀ 1971:
346). However, Viy 18.7.1 (749a) states that, by definition,
the speech of a Kevalin, because it is harmless, can only be
true or neither-true-nor false.73 The statement associates higher
moral truth with this type of speech, which can thus be
compared with the ‘twilight-language’ (sandhÍ-bhÍÙÍ) of Tantric
Buddhism, which is also characterised as neither-true-nor-false.74
JambÜvijaya’s edition of the ÌhÍÔa 4.23 (238) contains the
following commentary of According to OKUDA (1975: 129),
MÀc 119 explains saÓsaya-vayaÔÐ <saÓÚaya-vacana> as
‘speech which expresses doubt’. But its commentator
Vasunandin (11th–12th century) interprets this as ‘speech of
children and old people’ as well as the sounds of (five-sensed)
‘roaring buffalos’ etc., which cause doubt as to their meaning,
while the Digambara authors AparÍjita and ÀÚÍdhara and the
Ëvetâmbara Haribhadra commenting on DVS 7, read saÓsaya-
karaÔÐ simply as ‘ambiguous speech’ (anekârtha-sÍdhÍraÔÍ).
Haribhadra classifies speech of children as aÔakkhara
<anakÙara>, incomprehensible, which also figures as the ninth
and last category listed in MÀc 119, which Vasunandin reserves
for expressions of animals of two-four senses, and for sounds
created by snipping fingers etc. (OKUDA 1975: 129).75
VyÍkØtÍ bhÍÙÍ refers to clear distinct speech with explicit
unambiguous meaning (RATNACANDRA 1988 IV: 511).76
There is no example given by the commentaries for distinct
speech which is neither-true-nor-untrue. AvyÍkØtÍ-bhÍÙÍ>, refers
to indistinct involuted or poetic speech consisting of obscure
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or unintelligible words ‘with deep and profound meaning’
(RATNACANDRA 1988 IV: 445; cf. GHATAGE 2001 II:
800).77 Mantras or sÜtras may be fitting examples. The fact
that the MÜlÍcÍra does not mention these two categories
reinforces the suspicion that they are redundant, and overlapping
with the category of incomprehensible language.
The most interesting case is pannavaÔÐ-bhÍsÍ <prajñÍpanÐ-
bhÍÙÍ>, explanation, the generic term which VardhamÍna
MahÍvÐra himself employs in the scriptures78 to designate his
discourse, which also gives the PannavaÔÍ-suttaÓ its name.
Like all descriptions of speech acts, pannavaÔÐ is a somewhat
ambiguous term, because it refers both to the illocutionary act,
locutionary content, and perlocutionary effect of proclaiming
something. This ambiguity is reflected in different translations
of the word. SCHUBRING (2000 § 69: 158) and DELEU
(1970: 169) translate pannavaÔÐ as ‘communication’
(Mitteilung). According to SCHUBRING (2000 § 69: 157 f.),
the examples for ‘communication’ given in Viy 10.3.3 (499b)
= PaÔÔ 866, ‘We want to [wollen] lie down’ (ÍsaissÍmo) etc.,
refer to ‘expressions of an intention’ (to do something).
However, DELEU (1970: 169) and LALWANI (1985: 133)
translate ÍsaissÍmo <ÍÚayiÙyÍmaÏ> as ‘we will lie down’ and
‘we shall lie down’ respectively, that is, as the description of
a future action or state.79 MÀLVAÇIYÀ (1971: 211), who
points to kindred views in the PÍli text Puggala-paññatti, prefers
the word ‘describing’ as a translation of pannavaÔÐ which he
renders as ‘speech that intends to describe a thing’. In this, he
follows the 13th century commentary of ÀcÍrya Malayagiri
who stated that pannavaÔÐ ‘means the speech that intends to
describe the thing (or event) [as it is]’.80 It is a form of asaccÍ-
mosÍ speech, ‘a speech which has nothing to do with norm
(validity or invalidity) but which only describes the thing (or
event)’: ‘To be more explicit, the speech which has nothing to
do with religious dos and do-nots but which simply describes
the thing is called PrajñÍpanÐ.’81 MÀLVAÇIYÀ (1971: 212)
cites the example quoted by the commentator Malayagiri’s
PrajñÍpanÍ-ÛÐkÍ, ‘Those who refrain from killing living beings
live long and enjoy good health (in the next birth)’,82 and
notes: ‘The gÍthÍ in point contains no command “do not kill”
but simply describes the fact that those who do not kill live
long and remain healthy.’ Such speech ‘has nothing to do
with religious dos and do-nots’ (MÀLVAÇIYÀ 1971: 211).
Hence, it should be distinguished from implicit performative
speech. But, of course, it may be interpreted as such by a
listener who infers an ‘ought’ from the ‘is’. MONIER-
WILLIAMS’ (1986: 659) Sanskrit - English Dictionary translates
the causative prajñÍpana as ‘statement, assertion’. LALWANI
(1985 IV: 133) apparently follows the Illustrated ArdhamÍgadhÐ
Dictionary of RATNACANDRA (1988 III: 443), based on
Malayagiri, in using the word ‘advice’ (upadeÚa).83 What is
probably meant by the term pannavaÔÐ is that from the
conventional point if view, which underlies the Jain ‘catuÙ-
koÛi’ of language usage, the testimony of an authoritative person
is neither true nor untrue, because its meaning may be
incomprehensible for a hearer, similarly to unintelligible
utterances of non-enlightened creatures. With imperatives and
addresses expressing universal truths or ideals has in common
that no referent exists in re at a given place and point of time
(as for instance in Malayagiri’s example which should not be
read as a prediction relating to a specific individual). The
multidimensional implications of a general statement or rule
such as this cannot be understood entirely in an instant, as
WITTGENSTEIN (1953: 53–55, § 138 40) noted in his remarks
on the relation between meaning and use of a word (ib., pp.
190 ff., § 138 f.). Moreover, the example given by the
commentaries concerning the necessary link between non-
violence and health cannot be proved or disproved from a
conventional perspective. It must be accepted on the basis of
the authority of the speaker. Interestingly enough, the two
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truth theory is not invoked by the commentaries in defence of
the concept of transcendental speech, being neither-true-nor-
false, in spite of its capability to immunise any statement against
criticism.84
PaÔÔ 832–857 gives another example for speech which
is neither-true-nor-false by discussing the question of the
‘congruity of grammatical and natural gender and number’
(SCHUBRING 2000 § 74: 158). It argues that words such as
go, cow, which express (genderless) universals but are
employed in masculine singular, are not false or both-true-
and-false, say, with regard to female cows, but neither-true-
nor-false. The same applies to imperatives (ÍjñÍpanÐ), since
‘we may order a person of any gender and this person may
or may not carry out our orders’ (MÀLVAÇIYÀ 1971: 326).85
The last of the four variants of ohÍraÔÐ-bhÍsÍ
<avadhÍraÔÐ-bhÍÙÍ>, or determinate speech, is another example
of speech which is neither-true-nor-false. Reflexive expressions
such as ‘I believe’ or ‘I think’ are said to be capable of
expressing any of the four modes of speech, depending on
whether they serve religion (ÍrÍhiya <ÍrÍdhita>), in which case
they are true by definition, harm religion (virÍhiya <virÍdhita>),
in which case they are false, both serve and harm religion, in
which case they are true-as-well-as-false, or whether they do
neither, in which case they are neither-true-nor-false (PaÔÔ
830–831 [246b]).86
The examples show that in the Jain philosophy of
speech pragmatic efficacy, that is, non-violence, supersedes
propositional truth:87
‘It goes with the sphere of ethics that all four
modes of speech, and consequently the mode of wrong
speech as well, are admitted, provided they are
employed in a pious way of mind (ÍuttaÓ=samyak),
while even true speech coming from a sinner’s mouth
will count for nothing (Pannav. 268a)’ (SCHUBRING
2000 § 74: 158).
Conversely, as mentioned before, ‘a mode of speech springing
from emotion is by itself understood as mosÍ’ (SCHUBRING
(2000 § 74: 157). In other words, the speaker’s state of mind,
his / her beliefs, attitudes or intentions (if not his / her Being),
and the specific pragmatic context is decisive, not the words
themselves, or their propositional meaning. Arguments relating
to the ‘higher truth’ of morality based on similar considerations.
HANDIQUI (1968: 266) notes that the 10th century Digambara
ÍcÍrya Somadeva is more concerned with ethics than with
propositional truth:
‘Somadeva appears in certain circumstances to
attach greater importance to self-preservation and
philanthropic considerations than to speaking the truth.
He opines that the truth must not be spoken if it is
likely to endanger others and bring inevitable ruin to
oneself.’
Another example of this attitude is given by the
Ëvetâmbara ÀcÍrya Hemacandra who, in his 12th century
YogaÚÍstra (YÚ 2.61) and self-commentary, narrates that the
sage KauÚika, who was famous for speaking the truth, ‘went
to hell because accurate information given by him led to the
capture and killing of a band of robbers’ (cited by HANDIQUI
1968: 266 n. 4):
‘On the other hand (api), even though a statement
may be true, it should not be spoken if it causes
affliction to others [This is] because, even if it is
accepted [by all the people] in the world, KauÚika was
sent to hell [on account of making such a statement]’
(YË 2.61).88
The explanations of the four modes of speech in
canonical Jain literature and its medieval Sanskrit commentaries
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show that they are conceived as meta-rules, on a level of
abstraction comparable to the discourse ethics of universal
pragmatics, while the sub-categories and examples correspond
to the level of empirical semantics and pragmatics. The levels
of abstraction of the lists of examples in the commentaries
vary, since the Jain lists are relatively unsystematic, although
some may have been intended as scholastic devices for
cumulative indexication qua fixed analytical perspectives. From
the point of view of comparative analytical philosophy, some
examples could serve as illustrations for one or other of the
conversational postulates à la Grice (‘be relevant’ etc.), Searle,
or Habermas, while others can be related to the modern logical
investigations of vagueness, category mistakes, quantifiers, or
modalities of time in particular. In contrast to modern
intentionalist semantics, Jain philosophers of language analyse
examples of their four fundamental types of speech rarely
with reference to the intention of the speaker, but prefer an
objective or listener’s standpoint. That is, they investigate the
structure of the utterance as a whole, from the de-contextualised
point of view of the four combinations of the basic true / false
distinction, seen from the perspective of discourse ethics. The
same perspective is preferred by universal pragmatics.
We can conclude from this brief discussion of the
explanations of the four modes of speech in the Ëvetâmbara
canon and the commentaries that the rules of Jain discourse
are less concerned with referential truth than with the pragmatics
of speech;89 in particular with the expression of the ‘higher
truth’ of religious insight gained through direct self experience,
and speaking in accordance with the ethics of non-violence.
Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that truth in Jain discourse
is always defined as an aspect of objective illocutionary force,
depending on the form of the utterance and the intentional
state of a speaker alone, without the need to be backed up by
argument in processes of critical inquiry. The primacy of
pragmatic ethical and moral considerations, though considered
from a monological perspective, makes the Jain theory of
speech in many ways akin to universal pragmatics. It is
apparent that, albeit unsystematically presented, for almost all
universal pragmatic principles and conversational postulates
there are functional equivalences amongst the Jain principles
and rules of speech, which are by no means ‘primitive’ and
‘ill-assorted’, as for instance the philologist SCHUBRING (2000
§ 74: 157) believed. Jain principles and rules of discourse are
not mere examples of a culture-specific ‘particularistic ethics’,
as LAIDLAW (1995: 14) argues, but form a ‘comparatively
systematic code which is well-grounded in objective
considerations’ (CAILLAT 1991: 14).
The analysis of the implications of the Jain maxim of
truth and the general rules for proper language usage shows
that the ‘universal validity claims’: propositional truth, normative
rightness, and truthfulness are important considerations of Jain
discourse ethics. Despite the primacy of non-violence and
sincerity of expression, there are numerous examples for rules
concerning referential truth, the ideal of univocal or straight
(Øju) speech, and the avoidance of deception, especially ÀyÍra
2.4.1.1, ÀyÍra 2.4.2.19, and DVS 8.46.90 Such rules of
avoidance of false representations (including false reference to
past, present and future) and non-deceptive speech etc., can
be understood as expressions of a pragmatic anti-illusionist
(anti-BrÍhmaÔic) realism, that is, as anti-deception strategies.
Although, the Jaina texts deliberately avoid defining certain
words as ‘sacred’, for Jainism, too, ‘correct speech is of
religious value’ (CAILLAT 1984: 71) in so far as the foremost
requirement for the realisation of Jain norms is restraint
(negative politeness) in mind, speech and action. The norms
of unequivocal and grammatically correct signification and
transmission of information are fundamental for the Jain
understanding of proper language use. The religious ideal of
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correct, truthful and non-violent manner of speech is
summarised in the following passage, already quoted above:
‘A monk or nun, putting aside wrath, pride, deceit,
and greed, considering well, speaking with precision,
what one has heard, not too quick, with discrimination,
should employ language in moderation and restraint’
(ÀyÍr 2.4.2.19).91
What is manifest in this statement is that the Jain maxims
themselves address the necessity of avoiding the violence and
the consequential karmic results of ‘flouting’ the rules of proper
speech by means of off-record strategies. At the same time,
negative politeness (especially conventional indirectness) is
regarded as mandatory for maintaining the vows of non-
violence and truth in language usage. Recommended speech-
strategies are usually forms of negative politeness, such as
conventional indirectness, impersonalisation or nominalisation.92
Impersonalisation by way of transforming directives and
commissives into assertives, that is, a second-person
performative perspective into a third-person observer’s
perspective, is the preferred method; evidently, because in this
way ‘illocutionary force switches over into the propositional
content and thereby loses, if not its meaning, at least its force’
(HABERMAS 1993: 27).93 For instance, one should not say
‘this should be done’, but ‘this is’. And one should not speak
about forbidden subjects, such as business-choices etc., at all.
One should not ask householders to do something, or ‘forecast’,
or make promises to them (DVS
2
 7.46 f.; 51). Thus, although
the Jain analysis of language usuage is essentially pragmatist,
its rules of proper speech are predicated on the denial of
pragmatic intent in favour of propositional statements whose
pragmatic implications are, if at all, to be worked out by the
listener, in a Gricean fashion:
‘Guessing the teachers thought and the purport of his
words, one should express one’s assent, and execute
(what he desires to be done). An excellent pupil needs
no express directions, or he is (at least) quickly directed;
he always carries out his duties as he is told’ (Utt 1.43
f.)
The running comparison between the theory of
communicative action and Jain discourse ethics revealed
significant similarities. Both approaches are rule-oriented, not
goal oriented. That is, they are concerned with the general
interest of many, not with the eudaemonic perspective of a
single actor, despite the fact that the methods of universalisation
are different. The respective ideals of consensus and non-
violence leading to liberation mutually implicate each other.
Basic non-violence is presupposed by communicative action,
and the general interest of all is presupposed by universal
non-violence. Though the criterion of generalisability, equal
interest, is not theorized in Jain philosophy, and only touched
upon with reference to specific negative rights such as the
privileged case of the universal interest in avoiding pain,94 the
scope of the moral universe is extended from humanity to all
living beings, whose essential spiritual equality is a fundamental
principle of Jaina philosophy. The vanishing points of both
theories, the ideal consensus of an infinite community of
interpretation and the ideal omniscient observer, presuppose
absolute knowledge and absolute consensus.
Yet, there are also significant differences. The main
difference between the transcendental pragmatics of mutual
recognition and the monadological Jain ethics of non-violence
concerns the nature of the fundamental principles. The former
is predicated on positive norms and the latter on norms of
prohibition. The implicit method of universalisation of Jain
ethics is the double negation, that is, the negation of non-
generalisable statements. The resulting priority of physical non-
action as a theoretical limiting case (not as a practical maxim)
unburdens the doctrine of discussions of specific dilemmas of
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norm application, thus safeguarding both generalisability and
contextual determinateness, while maintaining a perspective of
disengagement with the world and non-specific positive duties.
The second main difference between the two types of discourse
ethics concerns the moral division of labour presupposed by
Jain norms of discourse, which privileges institutionally verified
competent speakers or Ípta. In contrast to universal pragmatics,
Jain discourse ethics is not concerned with questions of human
justice, only with individual negative freedom.
Footnotes
1 The earliest formulations of this maxim in the Àgamas use the expression
musÍ-vÍya veramaÔaÓ (S. mØÙÍ-vÍda viramaÔa), cessation of telling lies.
Like SCHUBRING (2000 § 171: 301), BRUHN (2003: 8) notes: ‘The
concept of “truth” is not uniform. But there are several references to the
kaÙÍya.s as the root of undesirable speech”.
2 This approach, which informs the following analysys, goes back
to Peirce, Royce and Mead, and was further developed by APEL (1973)
and HABERMAS (1980). The principal analytical question is not: What
does it mean to understand an intention? But: What does it mean to
understand a speech act? Universal pragmatics focuses not only on
speech acts but on the normative presuppositions of ‘linguistically
mediated interaction’ and on the social function of speech for the co-
ordination of action. Building upon the work of analytical philosophers
such as WITTGENSTEIN  (1953), AUSTIN (1962), GRICE (1975),
SEARLE (1969) and sociolinguists such as GUMPERZ (1964) and HYMES
(1972), HABERMAS (1980) distinguishes three universal validity claims
presupposed by every communicative action: ‘truth’, ‘rightness’ and
‘truthfulness’.
3 ÀyÍra 2.4.1.4: aha bhikkhÜ jÍÔejjÍ cattÍri bhÍsÍ-jÍyÍiÓ, taÓ
jahÍ—saccam egaÓ paÎhamaÓ bhÍsa-jÍyaÓ, bÐyaÓ mosaÓ, taiyaÓ saccÍ-
mosaÓ, jaÓ Ô’eva saccaÓ Ô’eva mosaÓ Ô’eva saccÍ-mosaÓ—asaccÍ-
mosaÓ ÔÍma taÓ cautthaÓ bhÍsÍ-jÍyaÓ. CAILLAT (1991: 8 n.4) located
the following parallels to the above sÜtra in the Ëvetâmbara canon: Utt
24.20–23, ÌhÍÔa 4.23 (238), Viy 13.7.1a (621a-b), PannavaÔÍ 11 (860–
866). See also Viy 16.2.2b (701a), 18.7.1 (749a), 19.8 (770b), SamavÍya
13.1, and DVS 7.1–3. OHIRA (1994: 14, 155) is of the opinion that the
four modes were first taught at the time of DVS 7, which she dates
between 5th–4th century BcE.
4 In contrast to the debate on the use of the catuÙ-koÛi in ‘Buddhist
logic’, focusing largely on the ‘negative dialectic’ of NÍgÍrjuna, the
cited Jain cases indicate that the catuÙ-koÛi was used (at least by Jains)
from early on as a scholastic frame for the discussion of logical alternatives,
without specific doctrinal implications being connected with the frame
itself.  MURTI (1955: 129) noted early on: ‘Four alternative views are
possible on any subject’. Notably, the four alternatives in ÀyÍra 2.4.1.4
etc., are disjunctive, not additive, as stereotypical representations of
‘Jaina Logic’ generally assume. Because Jain usage of catuÙ-koÛis was
ignored, and because of the almost exclusive focus on NÍgÍrjuna, Buddhist
scholars compared the ‘four-cornered negation’ only with the ‘Jain
relativism’ in general. They derived the catuÙ-koÛi either speculatively
from Jain syÍd-vÍda (GUNARATNE 1980: 232) or vice versa (BAHM
1957: 128), or (and) contrasted it with ‘the relativistic logic proposed by
the Jains, to which Buddhism was opposed’ (JAYATILLEKE 1967: 82).
According to RAJU (1954), the mythical Sanjaya framed the four
alternatives already in the 7th century BCE, negating all of them, whereas
‘Jaina logicians saw a relative truth in each pole and thus adopted a more
positive and determinate attitude toward our cognitions of the world.’
For recent, less logocentric, views on NÍgÍrjuna, focusing on ‘skillful
means’, see for instance JONES (1978), SCHROEDER (2000). A similar
four-valued theory of truth was defended by the Megarians (PRIEST–
ROUTLEY 1989: 13), which demonstrates that no specific philosophical
position is associated with the form itself, only with its uses.
5 See DUNDAS (2007: 50 f.) on the analogy between four types of
armies and four types of ascetics in ÌhÍÔa 292 (4.280–1). ALSDORF
(1966: 186 f., cf. 190 f.) discussed a different type of catur-bhaÕgas in
Jaina literature, made up of combinations of two positive and two negative
possibilities. He pointed out that the use of the ‘fourfold combination’
is ‘very typical of the scholastic who never misses an opportunity to
make a “caturbhanga”, i.e. the four possible combinations of two positive
and two negative possibilities…’ (p. 186).
6 ÌhÍÔa 3.239 offers also a trilemma: (1) to state the truth (tavvayaÔa
<tadvacana>), (2) to state the untruth (tadaÔÔavayaÔa <tadanyavacana>),
(3) to state something meaningless or negative (no-avayaÔa <no-
avacana>); ÌhÍÔa 7.129 a heptalemma: (1) speech (ÍlÍva <ÍlÍpa>), (2)
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taciturnity (aÔÍlÍva <an-ÍlÍpa>), (3) flattery (ullÍva <ullÍpa>), (4) insult
(aÔ-ullÍva <an-ullÍpa>), (5) dialogue (saÓlÍva <saÓlÍpa>), (6) prattle
(palÍva <pralÍpa>), (7) contradiction (vi-ppalÍva <vi-pralÍpa>).
7 The differentiation between ‘the True (sacca) and the Wrong
(mosa)’ was characterised as ‘primitive’ by SCHUBRING (2000 § 74:
157).
8 I do not give the original wording in all cases. In different words,
the same teaching is expressed in DVS
1
 7.1–3, which may be the oldest
text concerning this subject:
cauÔhaÓ khalu bhÍsÍÔaÓ parisaÓkhÍya pannavaÓ /
doÔhaÓ tu viÔayaÓ sikkhe, do na bhÍsejja savvaso // 1 //
jÍ ya saccÍ avattavvÍ saccÍmosÍ ya jÍ musÍ /
jÍ ya buddhehi ’ÔÍinnÍ, na taÓ bhÍsejja pannavaÓ // 2 //
a-sacca-mosaÓ saccaÓ ca aÔavajjam akakkasaÓ /
samuppeham asaÓdiddhaÓ giraÓ bhÍsejja pannavaÓ // 3 //
‘[1] Of the four kinds of speech, the thoughtful [monk] should,
after consideration, learn the training in two, [but] should not use the
other two ones at any occasion.
[2] That [form of speech] which is true, [but] not to be uttered,
that which is halftrue, that which is [quite] untrue and which is not
practised by the Jinas, the thoughtful monk should not use.
[3] [But] he should, after deliberation, use a speech not exposed
to doubt, [a speech] which is neither true nor untrue and [a speech] which
is true, provided that it is not to be blamed [and] rough’ (SCHUBRING
1932: 101).
See ÀyÍra 2.4.8–11 and cf. DVS 7.11, 7.2 for examples.
9 Cf. HABERMAS’ (1980: 419 ff.) / (1984–1987 I: 312 ff.) defence
of his clear-cut distinction between claims to truth and claims to
truthfulness.
10 Mookerjee, in TULSÐ (1985: 107): ‘Truthfulness is the revelation
of truth. (Gloss) Truth means the straight-forwardness [ØjutÍ] in deed
(physical movement), intention and word, and non-discrepant behaviour.
The revelation (disclosure) of that truth is called truthfulness.’ ‘(Note)
Here “truth”, as an ethical principle, is defined and explained. UmÍsvÍti
[TattvÍrtha-bhÍÙya 7.9], however has included revelation of ontological
reality also as an aspect of truthfulness.’
11 ÌhÍÔa 308 (4.349) gives the nikÙepa of satya: name, object,
knowledge, knowledge and action according to truth. ÌhÍÔa 254 (4.102)
distinguishes four types (aspects) of truth defined in terms of
unequivocality or sincerity (ujjuyayÍ <ØjutÍ>) of (1) gesture, (2) speech,
(3) mind, (4) seamless combination of the three, with the intention not
to deceive.
12 See also ÌhÍÔa 10.89.
13 JACOBI (1895: 160) translated bhÍva-satyÍ as ‘sincerity of the
mind’, and yoga-satyÍ as ‘sincerity of acting’.
14 MÍc 5.111: jaÔa-vada sammada ÛhavaÔÍ ÔÍme rÜve paÎucca-
sacce ya sambhÍvaÔa vavahÍre bhÍve opamma-sacce ya.
15 According to AÔD 605, contextual interpretation (aÔugama) of
the meaning of a sutta should progress in the following sequence: ‘Know
that the characteristic features (of exposition) are sixfold, viz. (1) the
(correct) utterance of the text (saÓhitÍ), (2) disjunction and parting (of
words), (3) paraphrasing, (4) expounding of compound words, (5)
anticipation of objections, and (8) establishment (of the correct meaning).’
16 Cf. ÌhÍÔa 4.349.
17 BHATT (1978: 14) emphasises that the nikÙepa in PaÔÔ 863 ‘has
no execution in the canonical context.’ The material is therefore likely
to belong to ‘post-canonical works from which it was taken before the
canon acquired its present shape.’ He lists similar passages in the canon
and the commentary literature (BHATT 1978: 157).
18 PaÔÔU 81: jana-pada-satyaÓ nÍma nÍnÍ-deÚÐ-bhÍÙÍ-rÜpam apy
avipratipattyÍ yad ekÍrtha-pratyÍyana-vyavahÍra-samartham iti,
yathôdakÍrthe koÓkaÔÍdiÙu payaÏ piccaÓ nÐram udakam ity-Ídi, aduÙÛa-
vivakÙÍ-hetutvÍn nÍnÍ-jana-padeÙv iÙÛÍrtha-pratipatti-janakatvÍd
vyavahÍra-pravØtteÏ satyam etad iti, evaÓ ÚeÙeÙv api bhÍvanÍ kÍryÍ.
PaÔÔÌ
1
 257a.1: ity-Ídi “jaÔa-vaya-saccÍ” iti taÓ taÓ jana-padam
adhikØtyêÙÛÍrtha-pratipatti-janakatayÍ vyavahÍra-hetutvÍt satyÍ jana-pada-
satyÍ yathÍ koÕkÍÔÍdiÙu payaÏ piccam ity-Ídi.
19 PaÔÔU 81: sammata-satyaÓ nÍma kumuda-kuvalayôtpala-
tÍmarasÍnÍÓ samÍne paÓkaja-saÓbhave gopÍlâdÐnÍÓ sammatam
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araviÓdam eva paÓkajam iti.
20 PaÔÔU 81: sthÍpanÍ-satyaÓ nÍma akÙara-mudrÍ-vinyÍsâdiÙu yathÍ
mÍÙako’yaÓ kÍrÙÍpaÔo’yaÓ Úatam idaÓ sahasram idam iti.
21 PaÔÔU 81: nÍma-satyaÓ nÍma kulama-varddhayann api kula-
varddhana ity ucyate dhanam avarddhamÍno ’pi dhana-varddhana ity
ucyate, apakÙas tu pakÙa iti.
22 PaÔÔU 81: rÜpa-satyaÓ nÍma tad-guÔasya tathÍ rÜpa-dhÍraÔaÓ
rÜpa-satyaÓ, yathÍ prapañcayateÏ pravrajita-rÜpa-dhÍraÔam iti. PaÔÔÌ
1
257a: yathÍ dambhato gØhÐta-pravrajitarÜpaÔ pravrajito ’yam iti.
23 OKUDA (1975: 127) translates pratÐtya-satyÍ as ‘relative truth’.
24 PaÔÔU 81: pratÐtya-satyaÓ nÍma yathÍ anÍmikÍyÍ dÐrghatvaÓ
hrasvatvaÓ cêti, tathÍ hi tasyânaÓta-pariÔÍmasya dravyasya tat tat-
sahakÍri-kÍraÔa-sannidhÍnena tat tad-rÜpam abhivyajyata iti satyatÍ.
PaÔÔÌ
2
 257a uses the expression pratÐtya-ÍÚritya, recourse to confirmation.
PaÔÔV 11.17 gives the synonym apekÙÍ, consideration or regard.
25 PaÔÔU 81: vyavahÍra-satyaÓ nÍma dahyate giriÏ galati bhÍjanaÓ
anudarÍ kanyÍ alomÍ eÎiketi, giri-gata-tØÔÍdi-dÍhe loke vyavahÍraÏ
pravarttate, tathôdake ca galati sati, tathÍ saÓbhoga-jÐva-
prabhavôdarâbhÍve ca sati, lavana-yogya-lomÍbhÍve cêti.
26 PaÔÔU 81: bhÍva-satyaÓ nÍma ÚuklÍ balÍkÍ, saty api paÓca-
varÔa-saÓbhave.
27 PaÔÔU 81: yoga-satyaÓ nÍma chattra-yogÍc chattrÐ daÔÎa-yogÍd
daÔÎÐty evam Ídi.
28 Cf. UPADHYAYA (1987: 105–7) on Hemacandra’s examples of
upacÍra, secondary meaning of a word based on similarity.
29 PaÔÔU 81: upamayÍ satyaÓ nÍma samudravat taÎÍgaÓ.
30 The problem of the vagueness of the concept of ‘heaps’ is also
addressed in the so-called sorites paradoxes attributed to Eubilides.
31 ÌhÍÔa 254 (4.102) distinguishes four types (aspects) of untruth
defined in terms of equivocality or insincerity (aÔujjuyatÍ <anØjukatÍ>)
of (1) gesture, (2) speech, (3) mind, (4) contradictory combination of the
three, with the intent to deceive.
32 According to Jain philosophy, cognitive and motivational factors
are linked. See also HYMES (1972: 283) notion of communicative
competence: ‘The specification of ability for use as part of competence
allows for the role of non-cognitive factors, such as motivation, as partly
determining competence. In speaking of competence, it is especially
important not to separate cognitive from affective and volitive factors,
so far as the impact of the theory on educational practice is concerned;
but also with regard to speech design and explanation.’
33 Arguably, conditions such as anger and pride can also evoke
(painfully) true statements.
34 Viy 1.9.1 (95a).
35 Following Haribhadra (PaÔÔU 82: ÍkhyÍyikÍ
asaÓbhÍvyâbhidhÍnaÓ) and Malayagiri (PaÔÔÌ
1
 258b.9: ÍkhyÍyikÍ-
niÏsØtÍ yat-kathÍsv-asambhÍvyÍbhidhÍnam), akkhÍiya <ÍkhyÍyika> is
usually understood as a narrative (kathÍ) of something non-existing or
impossible, based on mere ‘legend’ or hearsay. See RATNACANDRA
(1988 I: 59), and GHATAGE (1996 I: 64). This betrays the spirit of
realism of Jain philosophy. Though, kathÍ may also refer to ‘talk’,
‘discussion’ or ‘disputation’. Potentially negative consequences of
knowledge based on mere hearsay are explained in Viy 9.31(430a–438a).
ÌhÍÔa 7.80 lists seven types of gossip (vi-kahÍ <vi-kathÍ>).
36 UvaghÍya / uvagghÍya <upaghÍta> is explained by Malayagiri
(PaÔÔÌ 258b.10) through the example cauras tvam (‘you are a thief’),
understood here as abhyÍkhyÍna—false and groundless accusation. The
term upaghÍta generally designates an act of violence, but here more
specifically an insult. See also ÀyÍra 2.4.8 for this and similar examples
of ‘sinful speech’.
37 ÌhÍÔa 6.100 lists six types of unwholesome speech. ÌhÍÔa 6.101
lists six types of false accusations, related to the context of enumeration
(pathÍrÍ <prastÍra>) in confession.
38 See for instance NYAYAVIJAYA (1998: 343–5).
39 On combinations of truth and untruth in behaviour (vyavahÍra),
intent (pariÔata), belief (dØÙÛi) etc., for instance in succession, theorised
in terms of character types, see ÌhÍÔa 241 (4.35–44). See CAILLAT
(1965/1975: 80) on types of duplicity to be avoided.
40 DSV 7.4–5:
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ØÙÍtvÍt, [5] tathÍ yadÍ prabhÜteÙu m
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1  259a: tathÍ
pratyeka-vanaspati-saÕghÍtam
 ananta-kÍyikena saha rÍÚÐ-kØtam
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1  259a: [9] tathÍ addhÍ—
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ekadeÚo ’ddhâddhÍ sÍ miÚritÍ yayÍ sÍ addhâddhÍ-miÚritÍ, yathÍ prathama-
pauruÙyÍm eva varttamÍnÍyÍÓ kaÚcit kañcana tvarayan evaÓ vadati—
cala madhyâhnÐ-bhÜtaÓ iti.
53 HABERMAS (1981: 97–117) / (1984–1987 II: 62–76), and others,
showed that semantic content of normative sentences can be transformed
into propositional sentences while the reverse is not always possible.
54 DVS 7.6–10:
tamhÍ gacchÍmo, vakkhÍmo, amugaÓ vÍ Ôe bhavissaÐ /
ahaÓ vÍ ÔaÓ karissÍmi, eso vÍ ÔaÓ karissaÐ // 6 //
evamÍÐ u jÍ bhÍsÍ esa-kÍlammi saÕkiyÍ /
saÓpayÍÐyam aÛÛhe vÍ taÓ pi dhÐro vivajjae // 7 //
aÐyammi ya kÍlammÐ paccuppannam aÔÍgae /
jamaÛÛhaÓ tu na jÍÔejjÍ “evameyaÓ” ti no vae // 8 //
aÐyammi ya kÍlammi paccuppannam aÔÍgae /
jattha saÕkÍ bhave taÓ tu “evameyaÓ” ti no vae // 9 //
aÐyammi ya kÍlammi paccuppannam aÔÍgae /
nissaÕkiyaÓ bhave jaÓ tu “evameyaÓ” ti niddise // 10 //
55 See the mixed true-false utterance ‘The god of the sky’ (ÀyÍra
2.4.1.12–13) and similar examples of mislabelling discussed in footnote
293.
56 In symbolic logic such problems are discussed under the labels
such as ‘no-item thesis’, ‘misleading form thesis’, ‘truth value gap thesis’,
and ‘new truth-value thesis’ (HAACK 1974: 47 ff.). According to PRIEST
(1987 / 2006) the single rationale underlying the theory of different
types of truth value gaps, derived from the correspondence theory of
truth, is that ‘for certain sentences, a there is no Fact which makes a true,
neither is there a Fact which makes ¬a true’, which are to be distinguished
from dialetheia, or true contradictions such that both statement A and its
negation, ¬A, are true. In his view, the argument fails, because ‘if there
is no Fact which makes a true, there is a Fact which makes ¬a true, viz.
the Fact that there is no Fact which makes a true’ (ib., p. 54).
57 See for instance BALBIR (1987: 9) and DUNDAS (1996: 62).
58 PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1983: 14) cite Stoic and other authors from
Greek antiquity defending this view.
59 ‘In this respect the Jains anticipate contemporary discussive
logic, initiated by JaÚkowski, and they may similarly be interpreted in
terms of integration of different worlds, or positions, reflecting partial
truth … Naturally such a theory risks trivialisation unless some (cogent)
restrictions are imposed on the parties admitted as having obtained
partial truth—restrictions of a type that might well be applied to block
amalgamation leading to violations of Non-Contradiction.
Unlike the Jains, the MÍdhyamikas apparently affirmed the law
of Contradiction. But this does not prevent a certain unity of opposites,
e.g. in the negative dialectic of NÍgÍrjuna, a concept, such as Being, can
become indistinguishable from its opposite, Non-Being’ (PRIEST–
ROUTLEY 1983: 17).
60 STCHERBATSKY (1958: 415), cited in PRIEST–ROUTLEY
(1989: 16).
61 LALWANI’s (1985 IV: 133 f.) rendition of Viy 10.3.34 reads as
follows: ‘[Gautama speaks] Bhante! There are twelve forms of language—
address, order, prayer, question, advice, refusal, consent, enquiry,
conviction, confusion, distinct and indistinct. Now, when one says, I
shall take lodge, I shall lie, I shall stand, I shall sit, I shall stretch, do
these forms conform to the fifth type viz. advice, and it is correct to say
that they are never false?—[MahÍvÐra answers] Yes Gautama! They
conform to the fifth type and they are never false.’
62 On articulated (akkhara-suya) evidence, composed of written and
oral sources see SCHUBRING (2000: § 74).
63 ÀyÍra 2.4.1.4 n., 2.4.1.7.
64 AUSTIN (1962) distinguishes between implicit and explicit, self-
verifying, performatives. An ‘explicit performative sentence’, such as
taking a vow, ‘indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing
of an action—it is not normally thought of as just saying something’ (ib.,
pp. 6 f.)—this would be a ‘descriptive fallacy’ (ib., p. 3). ‘None of the
utterances cited is either true or false’ (ib.). ‘It is essential to realize that
“true” and “false”, like “free” and “unfree”, do not stand for anything
simple at all; but only for a general dimension of being a right or proper
thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this
audience, for these purposes and with these intentions. … This doctrine
is quite different from much that the pragmatists have said, to the effect
that the true is what works, &c. The truth or falsity of a statement
depends not merely on the meanings of words but on what act you were
performing in what circumstances’ (ib., p. 144). The problem of
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determining truth-values of performative utterances has been discussed,
for example, by FAUCONNIER (1981: 182).
65 ÌhÍÔa 6.111 lists six types of question-contexts, not all of which
can be categorised as neither-true-nor-false; e.g. vuggaha-paÛÛha
<vyudgraha-praÚna>, questioning an opponent.
66 On ambiguities created by the use of the future tense see also
FAUCONNIER (1981: 180 f.), and others.
67 HAACK (1974: 58 f., 73–90) criticises the ‘modal fallacy’ in
Aristotle’s argument on future contingents, but accepts it as valid if
interpreted as a truth value gap theory.
68 See further STRAWSON (1950) and the ensuing debate, on
which see also HORN (1985), (2001: 362 ff.), and others.
69 Muni Nathmal (ÀcÍrya MahÍprajña) characterized asatyÍ-mØÙÍ
language as vyavahÍra-bhÍÙÍ, or conventional or common speech (ÌhÍÔa
4.23, HindÐ commentary).
70 PaÔÔU 82 f.: “ÍmantaÔÐ” ity-Ídi, he deva iti ÍmantaÔÐ, eÙÍ
kilÍpravarttaka-nivarttakatvÍt satyâdi bhÍÙÍ-traya-lakÙaÔa-viyogataÚ
câsatyâmØÙêti, evaÓ sva-buddhayÍ anyatrâpi bhÍvanÍ kÍryêti, kajje parassa
pavattaÔaÓ jahÍ imaÓ karehitti ÍÔavaÔÐ, katthai vatthu-visesassa dehitti
maggaÔaÓ jÍyaÔÐ, aviÔÔÍyassa saÓdiddhassa vÍ atthassa jÍÔaÔatthaÓ
tad-abhijutta-codaÔaÓ pucchaÔÐ, viÔÐyassa uvaeso jahÍ—pÍÔavahÍu
ÔiyattÍ havati dÐhâuyÍ arogÍ ya emÍdi paÔÔavaÔÐ paÔÔattÍ vÐyarÍgehiÓ.
PaÔÔÌ
1
 258b: “ÍmantaÔi” iti tatra ÍmantraÔÐ he devadatta ity-Ídi, eÙÍ hi
prÍg-ukta-satyâdi-bhÍÙÍ-traya-lakcaÔa-vikalatvÍn na satyÍ nÍpi mØÙÍ nÍpi
satyÍ-mØÙÍ kevalaÓ vyavahÍra-mÍtra-pravØtti-hetur ity asatyÍ-mØÙÍ.
71 PaÔÔÌ
1
 259a: abhigØhÐtÍ prati-niyatârthâvadhÍraÔaÓ, yathÍ idam
idÍnÐÓ karttavyam idaÓ nêti.
72 PaÔÔÌ
1
 259a: anabhigrahÍ yatra na prati-niyatârthâvadhÍraÔaÓ,
yathÍ bahukâryeÙv avasthiteÙu kaÚcit kañcana pØcchati—kim idÍnÐÓ
karomi?, sa prÍha—yat pratibhÍsate tat kurv iti.
73 DELEU (1970: 241).
74 JambÜvijaya’s edition of the ÌhÍÔa 4.23 (238) contains the
following commentary of Jinabhadra’s ViÚeÙÍvaÚyaka-bhÍÙÍ (VÍBh) 376–
7: aÔahigaya jÍ tÐsu vi saddo cciya kevalo asacca-musa.
75 PaÔÔÌ
1
 259a: saÓÚaya-karaÔÐ yÍ vÍk anekârthâbhidhÍyitayÍ
parasya saÓÚayam utpÍdayati, yathÍ saindhavamÍnÐyatÍm ity atra
saindhava-Úabdo lavaÔa-vastra-puruÙa-vÍjiÙu. SCHUBRING (2000 § 74:
157 f.): ‘All animals with two to four senses and beings with five senses
express themselves in the neither true nor wrong way, but the latter will
employ the first three modes just as well (Pannav. 260a) provided they
have learnt to do so or carry along with them a higher ability.’
76 PaÔÔÌ
1
 259a: vyÍkØtÍ yÍ prakaÛÍrthÍ.
77 PaÔÔÌ
1
 259a: avyÍkØtÍ atigambhÐra-ÚabdârthÍ avyaktâkÙara-
prayuktÍ vÍ avibhÍvitârthÍtvÍt.
78 The PÍli equivalents of pannavaÔÍ and pannatta are paññÍpana,
paññatta (MÀLVAÇIYÀ 1971: 212). The word pannatti <prajñapti>,
teaching, information, instruction, is frequently used in the canon, for
instance at Viy 2.1.90, or Viy 16.6 (709b) where the verbs pannaveti
parÜveti <prajñÍpayati prarÜpayati> are used in to describe MahÍvÐra’s
preaching activity. Hence, his teachings are called pannavaÔÍ
<prajñÍpana>, exposition, or parÜvaÔa <prarÜpana>, explanation (AGD
51, MÀLVAÇIYÀ 1971: 210). The ‘proclamations’ (Kundmachung) or
preachings of the unattached ones are also called niggantha pÍvayaÔa /
pavayaÔa <nirgrantha pravacana> in Viy 2.5.5 (134b), 20.8.5 (792b) and
ÌhÍÔa 176a. See SCHUBRING 2000 § 37: 73).
79 DELEU (1970: 169) writes: ‘ÍsaissÍmo is ÍÚayiÙyÍmaÏ, not, as
Abhay. says, ÍÚrayiÙyÍmaÏ.’ According to the rules of speech in ÀyÍra
2.4.1.5 and DVS 7.8–10 one should avoid such a statement if one cannot
be entirely sure.
80 PaÔÔÌ 249b: yathÍvasthitârthâbhidhÍnÍd iyaÓ prajñÍpanÐ, in
MÀLVAÇIYÀ (1971: 211, cf. 346).
81 Contrary to MÀLVAÇIYÀ’s (1971: 211) view that asatya-mØÙÍ
speech ‘has nothing to do with norm’ it is obvious that by referring to
situations that ought to be both imperatives, commissives (vows), and
declaratives imply normative conditions, even if used by an enlightened
being. Only assertives attempt to represent situations as they are. Searle
showed that from the hearer’s perspective even literal speech implies a
contextual horizon to be intelligible (HABERMAS 1980: 452) / (1984–
1987 I: 337). According to PaÔÔ 246b, asatyÍ-mØÙÍ speech signifies not
only ohÍraÔÐ <avadhÍraÔÐ> or determinative expressions such as ‘I believe’
or ‘I think’, but all attempts to communicate transcendental truth through
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descriptive (prajñÍpanÐ) speech, which is assumed to be context-free and
thus by definition neither-true-nor-false (satyÍ-mØÙÍ). The PaÔÔ accounts
for the use of certain classificatory terms and words which express
universals (e.g. masculine, feminine, neuter) without clearly specifying
their contextual range of meaning. Imperatives such as ‘go ahead’ belong
to this category too. For instance, we may ‘order a person of any gender
and this person may or may not carry out orders. … This ÍjñÍpanÐ
(imperative) speech too could not be held as false. It should be regarded




pÍÔivahÍu niyattÍ havaÓti dÐhâuyÍ arogÍ ya /
emÍÐ paÔÔattÍ paÔÔavaÔÐ vÐyarÍgehiÓ //
83 Utt 28.16 ff. lists amongst the ten sources of right insight (samyag-
darÚana) communications such as upadeÚa, instruction, ÍjñÍ, command,
bÐja, seed (suggestion), as well as abhigama, comprehension of the sacred
scriptures, and vistÍra, complete course of study (including proofs, pramÍÔa,
and perspectives, naya): nisagguvaesa-ruÐ, ÍÔÍ-ruÐ sutta-bÐya-rui-meva /
abhigama-vitthÍra-ruÐ, kiriyÍ-saÓkheva-dhamma-ruÐ // .
84 Cf. MURTI (1955: 129) on transcendental language which
expresses truth which is beyond language; and GANERI (2002: 271) on
the non-assertible (inexpressible) in classical Jain seven-valued logic
(sapta-bhaÕgÐ), which may be conceptually related to incomprehensible
speech.
85 This example could be interpreted as an early version of the
‘misleading form thesis’ addressed by RUSSELL (1905) and others. See
HAACK (1974: 53–55). By contrast, the example ‘Devadatta, give me
the cow’, mentioned by GLASENAPP (1915: 46), is neither-true-nor-
untrue as a simple performative.
86 Cf. SCHUBRING (2000 § 74: 158), MÀLVAÇIYÀ (1971: 325 f.).
87 Cf. CAILLAT (1965/1975: 80), QVARNSTRO
..
M (2002: 41 n. 4).
88 For discussion of the ethical implications of this dilemma, for
instance in terms of appropriateness, see for instance GERT (1973),
HARE (1981), WELLMER (1986: 26 ff.), and HABERMAS (1991: 170).
89 GANERI (2002: 277) shows that the sapta-bhaÕgÐ is also ‘not
strictly truth-functional’, but suggests a solution to this problem.
90 Interestingly, some Úlokas are similar to the last of GRICE’s
quality maxims: ‘Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence’,
which invokes questions of referential truth and of the relationship
between representational and expressive functions of language. The
definition of the concepts of truth and falsehood, or of aspects thereof,
is a notoriously difficult problem for modern science and philosophy,
whose discourse is constituted by this fundamental distinction according
to FOUCAULT (1981) and LUHMANN (1990). It is therefore interesting
to see how the Jains tackle this issue, which is one of their foremost
concerns. There is a note by LALWANI added to DVS 24.12 which
identifies three types of falsehood: ‘(i) to deny what is, (ii) to establish
what is not, and (iii) to alter the meaning’. They can be illustrated by
the following examples:
(i) Jainism propagates epistemic realism. Hence, it is not
surprising that there are explicit statements defending the
ideal of objective truth in the scriptures, as opposed to mere
appearance, opinion, or consensus. The following passage
stresses the necessity for ascetics to use their faculty of
judgement to discover the truth of a given phenomenon,
and not to be deceived by false appearances: ‘Employing
their judgment, they should know something for certain and
something for uncertain: (1) Having received food or not
having received food, having eaten it or not having eaten
it, has come or has not come, comes or does not come, will
come or will nor come’ (ÀyÍra 2.4.1.1–2). This orientation
toward the world, predicated on a realistic analysis of the
modalities of time, is diametrically opposed to BrÍhmaÔism
and VedÍntic concepts such as mÍyÍ etc. This is evident in
the following passage, which implicitly criticises the
confusion of natural phenomena with illusory imagery of
divine agency: ‘A monk should not say: “The god of the
sky! the god of the thunderstorm! the god of lightning! the
god who begins to rain! the god who ceases to rain! may
rain fall or may it not fall! may the crops grow or may they
not grow! may the night wane or may it not wane! may the
sun rise or may it not rise! may the king conquer or may he
not conquer!” They should not use such speech. … But
knowing the nature of things, he should say: “the air; the
follower of Guhya; a cloud has gathered or come down; the
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cloud has rained”’ (ÀyÍra 2.4.1.12–13).
(ii) False appearance and deception should be avoided by all
means: ‘A muni speaks of appearance, ignoring the truth,
encounters a sin. Then what to speak of one who indulges
in whole untruth [Note by LALWANI: When a woman is
dressed as a man and if she be called a man, it is a falsehood,
though in her dress she appears like a man …].’ (DVS
2
 7.5,
cf. ÀyÍra 2.4.1.3). Ways of ‘establishing what is not’, such
as vague promises and speculation, are also seen
indiscriminate or deceptive utterances, because of the
confusion of past, present, and future. Language which may
create doubt (‘maybe or not’) has to be avoided by all
means: ‘When one knows not true implication, in the context
of the present, past, and future, says not one, “surely it’s like
this”. When one is in doubt about implication, in the context
of the present, past and future, says not one, “surely it’s like
this”. “Surely it’s so”,—says one when one has not an iota
of doubt of implication about the present, the past and
future’ (DVS
2
 7.8–10, cf. DVS
2
 7.6–7, ÀyÍra 2.4.1.5). It is
remarkable, that early Jainism already insists on the correct
use of temporal modalities, which must be related to the
philosophy of transmigration, but also with the critique of
the BrÍhmaÔic sacred-word theory: ‘speech exists only the
moment when being spoken’ (SCHUBRING § 68 2000:
149). The practical value of all the cited examples is the
same: reducing illusory appearances to their ‘real’ content.
(iii) There are no further maxims concerning ‘changing the
meaning’ in the texts on the ways of speaking. Effectively,
however, Jain narrative literature is based on a method of
‘changing the meaning’ of Indian folklore (HERTEL 1922).
The combined systematicity and context-sensitivity of Jain
rules and regulations is particularly obvious in the following
statement of the Digambara author Vasunandin’s (1100 CE)
ËrÍvakâcÍra 209, which propagates not only the ‘abstention
from untruth spoken out of passion or hate’ but ‘from truth
too, if it provokes the destruction of a living being’ (cited
in WILLIAMS 1983: 78). This and similar examples illustrate
how the hierarchically superior principle of ahiÓsÍ
supersedes the maxim of truthfulness in cases of rule-
contradiction. Cf. MÀLVAÇIYÀ (1971: 325) on the role of
the (situational) conditions of truthfulness in the PannavaÔÍ.
91 Conversely: ‘[1.] The monks and nuns may not use the following
six forbidden forms of speech: lying, sneering, insult, coarse speaking,
worldly speech, or speech renewing atoned matters. 2. There are six cases
of idle talk about right conduct: of speaking rashly in relation to others,
of damaging living creatures, of untruthfulness, of forbidden
appropriation, of a jade, a eunuch, or a slave. Whoever uses those six
kinds of idle talk, without being able to prove them fully, ranks as one
who has committed the transgression himself’ (KS 6.1).
92 Cf. BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 134 ff.). In PaÔÔÌ folio 259 B
cited by MÀLVAÇIYÀ (1971: 212) the positive karmic consequences of
not killing are expressed in this way; avoiding commandments of the
form ‘do not kill’ for example by saying: ‘Those who refrain from killing
living beings live long and enjoy good health (in the next birth).’
93 See also AUSTIN (1962: 4) on disguising a performative utterance
as a descriptive or constative statement.
94 Cf. GERT's (1973) ‘minimal ethic’.
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